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Desposition and Discovery
By LAwBENCE S. GRAUMAN*
The Rules of Civil Procedure, both Federal and State, are the
result of extended efforts by the leaders of the Bar to place the
power to make rules of court where it belongs-in the hands of
the courts. In Kentucky the move to reform procedure in civil
cases was begun in 1949. At the meeting of the State Bar Associa-
tion in the spring of 1949, the Honorable Watson Clay, a Commis-
sioner of the Court of Appeals, delivered a masterful address call-
ing attention to how antiquated our civil procedure was and what
benefits would be available to the Bench, Bar and the litigants if
the provisions of the Civil Code were revised. Following Judge
Clay's convincing speech, the Association adopted a resolution
recommending a study of the Kentucky Civil, Code of Practice
with the objective of bringing it up to date.
At the 1950 Session of the General Assembly, the "Civil Code
Committee" was created. The Committee was composed of a
Judge of the Court of Appeals and six members appointed by the
Governor, two of the members to be Circuit Judges and four to
be members of the Kentucky State Bar Association. The writer
had the honor of being one of the two Circuit Judges appointed
by the Governor, serving until the work of the "Civil Code Com-
mittee" had been completed.
The Committee, after mature consideration, undertook the
drafting of a new Code, following the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure as closely as practicable. Discovery practice, the pre-trial
conference, summary judgments and special verdicts, and many
other modem phases of civil procedure were provided for in the
Federal Rules and did not exist under the Civil Code. The "Civil
Code Committee" drafted a complete set of rules relative to civil
procedure and made its report to the Court of Appeals. During
*judge, Common Pleas Branch (5th Div.), Jefferson County KentuckyCircuit Court.
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the period the Committee functioned drafting the proposed new
rules, the judiciary and members of the Bar were advised of the
work of the Committee through articles in the Kentucky State
Bar JOURNAL, addresses by members of the Committee before
various district bar meetings and the Judicial Conference, and
discussions before such meetings. The Committee, having com-
pleted its work, made its report to the 1952 General Assembly. In
the report the two important recommendations made were: (1)
that the Court of Appeals should be granted the procedural rule-
making power; and (2) that the Court of Appeals should adopt
civil rules substantially in accord with those submitted with the
report.
The 1952 General Assembly passed an act granting to the
Court of Appeals full authority to "regulate pleading, practice,
procedure and the forms thereof in all civil proceedings in all
courts of the State." The act required distribution to the judiciary
and Bar of Kentucky of the proposed rules, and provided for the
holding of public hearings before the adoption of the rules by the
Court of Appeals. The new rules were to become effective
July 1, 1953.
The Court of Appeals carefully considered the new rules
recommended by the Committee, and, with a few changes,
promulgated the Rules effective as of July 1, 1953. Now plenary
power to regulate the entire field of civil procedure in all courts
of the State is vested in the Court of Appeals.
The Rules now in effect-principally the product of the work
of the "Civil Code Committee"-provide the simplest and the
least technical form of civil procedure yet devised in any of the
state courts in our Union. All through the Commonwealth of Ken-
tucky the progressive members of the Bench and Bar proclaim
that the new civil procedure has achieved a tremendous success.
By Rule 1 of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure, the ob-
jective to be achieved in the construction of the Rules is set forth:
"They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpen-
sive determination of every action." The Rules providing for
"Depositions and Discovery," Rules 26 through 37, were drafted
to assure that no longer must civil trials be carried on in the dark
and to make obsolete the time-honored cry of "fishing expedition,"
as a means of foreclosing inquiry into the facts of a party's case.
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An epoch-making decision construing the Federal Rules rela-
tive to discovery and depositions is Hickman v. Taylor,1 wherein
the U.S. Supreme Court said:
The pre-trial-deposition-discovery mechanism established
by Rules 26 to 37 is one of the most significant innovations
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.... The new Rules,
however, restrict the pleadings to the task of general notice
-giving and investing the deposition-discovery process
with a vital role in the preparation for trial.... Thus, civil
trials in the Federal Courts no longer need be carried on in
the dark. The way is now clear, consistent with recognized
privileges, for the parties to obtain the fullest possible
knowledge of the issues and facts before trial....
We agree, of course, that the deposition-discovery Rules
are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer
can the time-honored cry of "fishing" serve to preclude a
party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's
case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered
by both parties is essential to proper litigation, and either
party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he
has in his possession. . . .The deposition-discovery pro-
cedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure
can be compelled from the time of trial to the period
preceding it, thus reducing the possibility of surprise.
The Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure 26 through 37 are
substantially the same as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26
through 37. Therefore, the rationale of the Hickman opinion is
applicable in construing the Kentucky Rules 26 through 37.
An experienced trial judge has said that "A fair and equitable
settlement of an action is often a more just, and certainly more
speedy determination of it, than ordinarily follows an actual trial
of the issues therein." Lawyers engaged in extensive trial practice
will not take issue with this statement. The discovery rules have
the laudable objective of procuring "the speedy and efficient
administration of justice," and enable the court to disregard
technicalities so as to determine the rights of litigants on the
merits. The principal means for securing the prompt disposition
of civil actions on their merits is for the courts to give a liberal
construction to the deposition-discovery mechanism. The objec-
tive of the court should be the swift, sure, impersonal, impartial
1329 U.S. 495, 500-01, 507 (1947).
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administration of justice. The words "subject matter" in the dis-
covery rules should be liberally construed to include the entire
scope of the action, from its origin to the collection of the judg-
ment. The discovery rules enable the state's judicial system to
keep pace with the nation's progress, and are one of the principal
factors in expediting the trial of cases. Unquestionably, by the
proper use of the discovery rules, the administration of justice
has been materially advanced. Discovery may work to the dis-
advantage as well as to the advantage of the plaintiff. Discovery
may work to the disadvantage as well as to the advantage of the
defendant. As Mr. Justice Murphy said in the Hickman case:
"Discovery, in other words, is not a one-way proposition. It is
available in all types of cases at the behest of any party, in-
dividual or corporate, plaintiff or defendant."
Clay, in discussing Rule 26.02, says: "A party may not require
his adversary to furnish a list of witnesses he proposes to use
since, while such matters would be relevant to the trial, they are
not relevant to the subject matter involved in the suit."'
Judge Clay's book was published in 1954. There have been
many well-considered opinions written which hold to the con-
trary. Some of the cases hold that not only may a party be com-
pelled to give the names and addresses of witnesses, but that
before using any additional witnesses at the trial, timely notice
must be given to the litigant who sought by discovery the names
and addresses of witnesses known to the opposite party.
I think the construction of the rule is sound which holds that
a party may be compelled to give the names and addresses of
witnesses known to him which he proposes to introduce at the
trial, and that before using any additional witnesses he must give
timely notice of their names and addresses. Such a construction
is designed to eliminate, as far as possible, concealment and sur-
prise in the trial of law suits, to the end that judgment therein
may be rested upon the real merits of the causes and not upon the
skill and maneuvering of counsel. Certainly a diligent lawyer
representing a party to a law suit should have an opportunity
before trial to investigate the background of witnesses for the
opposing side in order to discover any matter which might
affect the credibility of such witnesses, to hear their account
2 Clay, Kentucky Civil Rules 269-70 (1954).
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and to ascertain from them the names and addresses of any other
persons who might know something about the controversy.
Refusal of the court to require a litigant to disclose names and
addresses of witnesses known to the litigant which he proposes
to introduce at the trial results in a failure to attain the objective
of the Kentucky Rules as set forth in Rule 1, and deprives the
litigant seeking the information of a substantial right.
The right to pre-trial discovery of the names and addresses
of witnesses to an accident is within the discretion of the court.
There are cases where the court declined to require the disclosure
of the names and addreses of witnesses. On the other hand, there
are many cases wherein it has been held that under the discovery
rule the names and addresses of witnesses to an accident must be
disclosed upon proper inquiry by interrogatory or deposition.
In DeBruce v. Pennsylvania R.R.3 Judge Kirkpatrick said:
The practice of obtaining copies of the statements of
witnesses in answer to interrogatories without an extrinsic
showing of good cause, as that term is used in Rule 34, or
of prejudice arising from denying the disclosure, has always
been considered by this court and was, impliedly, sanc-
tioned by the Circuit Court of Appeals in its opinion in
Hickman vs. Taylor, 153 F. 2d 212. Inasmuch as the de-
cision of the Supreme Court does not forbid or disapprove
it, it will be continued as heretofore, in the practice as
further outlined in the opinion Nedimyer v. Pa. RR; D.C.,
6 FRD 21.
The question of the right to pre-trial discovery of names and
addresses of witnesses to an accident has been considered in many
cases involving carriers. In Atlantic Greyhound Corporation v.
Lauritzen,4 an action against a bus company for the death of a
boy killed in a collision between a bus and an automobile, it was
held that the lower court had properly sustained a motion for the
defendant's production of the names and addresses of all wit-
neses, all passengers on the bus, and their statements and certain
other information. The opinion was written by Judge Simons and
concurred in by Judges McAllister and Shackelford Miller, Jr.,
(formerly U. S. District Judge at Louisville). In rejecting the
contention that the lower court erred in requiring the bus com-
pany to produce the names and addresses of all witneses, all
3 6 F.R.D. 403, 405 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
4 182 F. 2d 540 (6th Cir. 1950).
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passengers on the bus, their statements, the bus schedule and the
driver's log, as well as all photographs, the court said:
The appellant relies upon Hickman v. Taylor, 829 U.S. 495,
67 S. Ct. 385, 894, 91 L. Ed. 451. That case does not throw
the protective cloak of privilege of information secured from
witnesses whose identity is unknown to the plaintiffs and
not available to them. The names of the witnesses, their
statements, the bus schedule, the driver's log and other in-
formation requested were not in the possession of the plain-
tiffs.... Hickman v. Taylor, supra, does not preclude grant-
ing the present petition for discovery.5
A liberal interpretation of the Kentucky rule relative to dis-
covery would not only require the disclosure of the names and
addresses of all witnesses, but would also require the disclosure
of the names and addresses of any witnesses learned subsequently,
that is, after the deposition for discovery has been taken or the
interrogatories propounded. A very recent case on this point is
that of Armstrong v. Diamond State Bus Lines, Inc.,' wherein
Judge Layton said:
Plaintiffs filed the following interrogatory:
'Plaintiffs repropound the following interrogatory which
shall be deemed to be continuing, so as to require supple-
mental answers if defendants, or either of them, obtain
further information between the time answers are served
and the time of trial.
1. State the names and addresses of all the passengers
who were on the bus at the time of the accident involved in
the present suit, insofar as such names and addresses are
known or available to the defendants, or either of them.'7
The defendants agreed to furnish the names and addresses of
the witnesses then known, but objected to being required to
furnish supplementary facts within the scope of the interrogatory
and which came to its or their attention ten days before the trial
date.
The court rejected the contention made by the defendants and
said:
The Federal Rule 83 is identical with that of this Court.
The Federal Courts have found little difficulty in dealing
5 Id. at 542.
6125 A. 2d 856 (Del. 1956).
7 Id. at 856.
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with this exact situation. They have consistently held that
counsel is not relieved of the obligation to supplement an
answer to an interrogatory already made when additional
information within its scope comes into his hands.
For instance, Judge Kirkpatrick in McNally v. Yellow Cab
Co., D.C.E.D. Pa. 1954, 16 F.R.D. 460, said this:
'However, it may not be out of place for the Court to say
at this time what should be obvious, namely, that the
defendant is bound to give truthful answers to the inter-
rogatories and that both good faith and the spirit of the
Rule require it to see to it that its answers are truthful as of
the time of the trial as well as of the time when the inter-
rogatories are answered.'
See also R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Decca Records, Inc., D.C.S.D.
N.Y., 1 F.R.D. 488. Compare Chenault v. Nebraska Farm
Products, Inc., D.C., 9 F.R.D. 529.8
In the R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Decca Records, Inc., case referred
to, the District Judge, Judge Leibell, said:
So far as the interrogatories require the production of infor-
mation defendants must disclose whatever information it
now has as demanded by the interrogatories. If in the
interim, between the time of the answers to these inter-
rogatories and the trial, defendants obtain further informa-
tion, they will not be prevented from offering such informa-
tion on the trial and should under this interrogatory furnish
it to plaintiff when it is obtained.9
In Furmanek v. Southern Trading Co.'0 an admiralty proceed-
ing was involved. The libellants propounded certain inter-
rogatories, and the respondents excepted to all the interrogatories
because the preamble or introductory statement advised re-
spondents that the interrogatories were to be deemed continuing,
so as to require supplemental answers, if respondents should ob-
tain further information between the time answers were served
and the time of trial. The District Judge, Judge Welsh, said:
In Wolf v. Dickinson, D.C., 16 F.R.D. (250), the identical
contention was raised and resolved against the objecting
party. See also Smith v. Acadia Overseas Freighters, Ltd.,
D.C., 120 F. Supp. 192, where it was held that the inter-
rogatories are to be deemed continuing even though there
8 Id. at 857.
9 RCA Mfg. Co. v. Decca Receords, Inc., 1 F.R.D. 433, 435 (S.D. N.Y. 1940).
1015 F.R.D. 405 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
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is no preamble to the interrogatories specifying that the
interrogatories are to be deemed continuing.'1
In the Wolf v. Dickinson case, supra, Judge Welsh said:
Thus, we hold that the interrogatories continue to speak
and the defendant is obligated to furnish supplemental
answers if he obtains additional information between the
time answers are filed and the time of trial.
12
In Kling v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co.,'
3
the court said:
Plaintiff is required to furnish defendant within thirty days
the names and addresses of the witnesses known to her at
this time which she proposes to introduce at the trial, pro-
vided that before using any additional witnesses she shall
give timely notice of their names and addresses to de-
fendant.
Thus it is seen that the construction made of the discovery
rule in the above cases enables all parties to have equal access to
the relevant facts. The right of discovery is mutual and equal, and
no party has an advantage over any other party if discovery is
permitted so that the identity and whereabout of persons having
knowledge of relevant facts is disclosed. To require a party to
state the names and addresses of witnesses then known which he
proposes to introduce at the trial, and to disclose the names and
whereabouts of any witnesses subsequently learned of before the
trial, certainly represents the basic policy underlying the dis-
covery rules. When the Honorable William Howard Taft was a
State Judge in Ohio, he stated that "Witneses do not belong to
one party more than to another."1 4 The rule gives the presiding
judge extensive power to simplify litigation and to enable litigants
to avoid surprise. There is no justifiable reason why a litigant
should not learn before the trial which of the witnesses known
to the adversary will be used at the trial.
Should the court allow witnesses to testify after failure of a
litigant to disclose their names and addresses in response to re-
quest therefor in pre-trial discovery proceedings?
Where a litigant, in reply to a question requesting the names
11 Id. at 406.
12 16 F.R.D. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
13 9 F.R.D. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1949).
14 Shaw v. Ohio Edison Co., 9 Ohio Dec. Reprints 809, 812 (Super. Ct. 1887).
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and addresses of witnesses who have knowledge of facts relevant
to the issues gives the names and addresses of some of the wit-
nesses, but fails to disclose such information with reference to
other witnesses then known to the litigant, and then, on the trial,
the litigant calls a witness not named in the answer but who was
known to the litigant when he made his answer, and the adverse
litigant objects to the witness' testifying, the court should refuse
to permit the witness to testify.-" The court held that to allow
such witnesses to testify would be a violation of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.
In Evtush v. Hudson Bus Transp. Co.'" plaintiff's decedent was
riding on a motorcycle which collided with the defendant's bus.
Haddon was a bus driver, and he took the names and addresses
of a few of the passengers in his bus at the time of the accident
and turned them over to his employer. An interrogatory had been
addressed to the bus company and the driver, asking the names
and addresses of witnesses and, in reply to the interrogatory, the
names of two passengers in the bus at the time of the accident
who had given their names to the driver were not disclosed. At
the trial the defendants introduced two witnesses whose names
had not been disclosed in the answer to the interrogatory, and
both of these witnesses gave testimony prejudicial to the plaintiff.
There was a verdict for the defendants, and, on appeal, the plain-
tiff contended that in failing to disclose the names and addresses
of the witnesses to the accident which were known to them at the
time of the answer to the interrogatory, the defendants not only
failed to comply with the obligation imposed upon them by the
rules, but also deprived the plaintiff of substantial rights. In dis-
cussing this question, the court said:
The rules for discovery here involved were designed to
eliminate as far as possible, concealment and surprise in
the trial of law suits to the end that judgments therein
be rested upon the real merits of the causes and not upon
the skill and maneuvering of counsel. It necessarily follows,
if such rules are to be effective, that the courts impose ap-
propriate sanctions for violations thereof. We therefore
conclude that the Appellate Division was right in reversing
the judgment of the trial court and ordering a new trial,
thereby eliminating the element of surprise which must have
25 Newsum v. Pennsylvania R.R., 97 F. Supp. 500 (S.D. N.Y. 1951).
167 N.J. 167, 81 A. 2d 6 (1951).
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accrued to the benefit of the defendants at the previous trial
because of their infraction of such rules.
17
In Sather v. LindahV8 a new trial was granted in a personal
injury accident because the plaintiff had, when his deposition was
taken four days before the trial, answered "Not that I know of,"
in response to the question, "Do you know of any witnesses to
this accident?", when in fact the plaintiff and his counsel did
know of four eye witnesses, whom they produced at the trial and
who testified without objection. On cross-examination of these
witnesses the defendants developed the fact that they had been
known to the plaintiff and his counsel. Subsequently, defendants
moved for a mis-trial, which motion was denied. On the appeal
the court said:
One of the purposes of the Rules of Pleading, Practice,
and Procedure pertaining to pre-trial discovery, includ-
ing depositions, 84A Wash 2d 84, ft., is to enable a
litigant to know in advance the witnesses upon whom his
adversary is relying and thus to avoid surprise, when, after
denying knowledge of witnesses which in fact he had, a
litigant produces those witnesses at the trial, the adverse
party should object to their being permitted to testify and,
if they are permitted to testify, should move that their testi-
mony be stricken. The trial judge can sustain such an ob-
jection and refuse to permit the witness to testify, or can
order his testimony stricken; or he can grant a continuance
to give the surprised party an opportunity to investigate
the witness and secure rebuttal testimony; and it is possible
that, under circumstances in which no other relief or penalty
could remedy the situation created by the deception, he
could grant a mistrial.
Our rule comes verbatim from the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 28 USCA.19
The trial court has implicit power to impose such penalty as
the circumstances of the particular case warrant, in order to see
that substantial justice will be done.
17 81 A. 2d at 9.
18 261 P. 2d 682 (Wash. 1958).
19 Id. at 682.
